

18 April 1954

MEMORANDUM TO: C/P

FROM : C/FI

SUBJECT : Summary of []

1. [] has been an exile in [] since he entered that country in December []

[] He has been described as ambitious, opportunistic and unscrupulous. During this time he has carried on correspondence with RUFOS, [] and representatives of other lesser opposition groups.

2. In February 1954 [] was set up with the objective of exploring the assets and capabilities of [] and determining the course of action which should be taken by FESUCCESS with respect thereto. It was to be pointed out to [] [] was his best hope for personal support, and there was only chance to realize his ambitions lay in cooperating with [] together with [] was to be provided with sufficient assurance of financial and material support to convince him of the sincerity and capability of [] Efforts were to be made to align him with CAMERIS, and in the event this was not possible he was to be effectively neutralized.

3. [] decided to use [] as the cut-out and [] as the man who would make all contacts with [] is a [] citizen. Both agents were assigned to this task exclusively. The first meeting between [] and [] took place on February 20. In this conversation [] said that he had the support of [] and that his principal backing came from (1) a group headed by four nephews in the Guatemalan Army (2) a group of loyal Army officers (3) another group of Army officers who are anti-ARMENZ but who want evidence that [] movement has solid support, and (4) a third group of Army officers who are scoundrels and who will go with the highest bidder. [] emphasized that any successful movement must be centered on an internal uprising and have supplementary assistance from abroad.

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4. In a cable dated 24 February [] was told that the purpose of the project was only to explore and that no mention was to be made of [] until the [] was well established. It was pointed out that [] status is limited and that LINCOLN will determine when and how he will fit into the overall program. [] was to be debriefed factually and the results forwarded to LINCOLN for study. At all times he must be compartmented from CALLIGERIS.

5. In a dispatch of 2 March, attached to which were seven debriefings of [] over the period from 21 to 26 February, [] states that [] is potential assets comprise a political organization in Guatemala which has pledges of support from political leaders and a liaison relation with prominent [] military and political figures. He made no pretense of having an external striking force, but he did say that he has the support of key military men in Guatemala. He also stated he has tight loyal cells in every department. He added that he had means to smuggle men and arms through [] and across the Guatemalan border. [] said that he would be willing to cooperate fully with CALLIGERIS, although he does not trust him.

6. [] said that he has three political parties pledged to him in Guatemala; the Redemption Party, the Partido Unida Anti-Comunista (PUA), and the Partido Juventud Nacionalista. His key men were stated to be []

[] He claimed to have potential control of two military outposts, one of which is that at the Aurora airport.

7. In early March the meetings with [] were held less frequently in compliance with LINCOLN instructions. In these conversations [] showed a tendency to become more general, instead of more specific as requested. He stated his strength lay with the people, and he discussed the problem of the Indians and the necessity for unity in all the classes. He indicated those persons he would prefer to have in his cabinet and provided a long list of Communists in Guatemala. On 13 March [] furnished a list of his men in the various departments. In general only one person was named in each section, and practically all are civilians. No details were provided concerning the assets or capabilities of these persons. He mentioned three loyal anti-Communists in Guatemala on 15 March, namely []

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8. In a meeting of 16 March [] furnished a list of his chief political adherents in each Guatemalan district. There were 27 officers on this list, including

[]

9. In a cable of 23 March [] was told that [] must soon demonstrate the ability of working in harness or else. On 27 March [] was asked to get more details regarding the exact nature of the [] organization. In a dispatch of 5 April [] states that a meeting between [] and [] leaders must take place shortly. An attached debriefing of 27 March contained more [] attacks on CALLIGERIS and provided a list of prominent Communists he hoped to have killed. He said that the Junta which should rule from the time ARBENZ is overthrown until elections take place should be composed of two civilians and one military man. He suggested []

10. At this stage [] begins to point out the risks [] and [] are running, and that they cannot continue to stall [] without hazard to themselves and their families. They say they must withdraw unless there is an immediate conference between [] and [] directors. On 6 April LINCOLN advised [] that the [] operation was temporarily suspended because of [] pressure tactics and the low evaluation of his effectiveness. [] suggested on 13 April that [] not be dropped unceremoniously, and that a temporary solution be devised. On 13 April [] says that [] and [] believe their withdrawal to be impossible on the basis of [] non-compliance with requests. A meeting was held with [] on 9 April, and it was anticipated that there would be one additional meeting. [] said that he would supply more names of his followers, consisting of those who do not constitute the core of the organization but who can be relied upon to join a resistance movement. [] was asked to prepare an estimate of his financial requirements and a proposed schedule or timetable.